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The Ombatse Crisis in Nigeria: 






This paper focuses on the hegemonic politics between the Eggon and Hausa/Fulani ethnic 
groups in Nasarawa, North-Central Nigeria, which eventually erupted into the Ombatse crisis 
of May 2013- a precursor to the 2015 general elections. It addresses four research questions 
seeking to unravel whether or not: (1a) the crisis truly reflects a spiritual revivalist agenda as 
projected by the Ombatse promoters or merely espouses Eggon rejection of Muslim-
Hausa/Fulani ethnic hegemony- mirroring broadly the identity, hegemonic and exclusionary 
politics in the area cum the larger Nigerian society;(b) the Eggon-Hausa-Fulani feud has the 
potential to exacerbate the sectarian strife in Nigeria’s northern region and therefore deepen 
the polarization among Nigeria’s disparate social groups-thereby threaten the consolidation of 
Nigeria’s young democracy; (2) there are any institutional safeguards in place to forestall the 
promotion of discriminatory tendencies in the politics of the state;(3) there is the likelihood of 
the tendencies in the Nasarawa politics nudging the state into violence after the 2015 
elections; and (4) there are viable solutions available to address the potentially violate 
situation. Methodologically, using both primary and secondary sources- interviews and works 
of scholars, and media reports on the crisis, the study came up with the following findings: 
(1) the Ombatse crisis is not a religious-puritanical cause, but fits into the themes of identity 
conflict, hegemonic and exclusionary politics; (2)the election outcome still reflected the deep 
divisions and polarization among Nigeria’s disparate social groups- projecting Nigeria yet as 
a deeply-divided society; (3) contrary to the pre-election anxiety, there were no violence 
during and after the elections-owing essentially to the moderating presence in Nigeria during 
the 2015 election of the International Criminal Court (ICC), who threatened to prosecute 
person(s) or group(s) that perpetrate violence in the course of the election; (4)Nasarawa 
politics lacks any ‘institutional safeguards to prevent the emergence of conditions in which 
divisions within the society gain a salient discriminatory dimension and eventually facilitate 
the rise of violence as a means to realize group interest’. The study suggests six 
recommendations that can promote the solution of the potentially violate situation; 
importantly, evolving a well-defined power-sharing framework, which aims at rotating such 
political offices among the ethnic groups for a better inter-group relations, implementing past 




Key words: Ombatse, Nasarawa-Eggon, Hausa-Fulani, identity, exclusionary and 
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Introduction 
In the last two decades, following the end of 1967-1970 civil war, Nigeria has had to 
grapple with one form of violence or the other –all defining the acute security challenge 
increasingly confronting the country. Most of the violence are sectarian in character, 
mirroring the deep divisions, among Nigeria’s over 450 ethno-linguistic groups. These rifts 
generally arise on the one hand from rivalry and competition for the abundant but badly-
managed material resources, and on the other by the subsequent hegemonic tendencies 
among the ethnic groups. In the North, it is epitomized by the Hausa-Fulani hegemony, 
whether real or perceived and its resistance by the minority ethnic groups. Although 
oftentimes localized- occurring in specific geographic locations, and constituting real threat 
to the immediate environment, they however also reverberate beyond the local boundaries 
thus generating enough concerns for the entire country. Most of these acts of the violence are 
usually viewed with ethno-regional and religious lens. Oftentimes, ignoring their underlying 
political and economic contexts, analyses focus on the façades of ethnicity, region and 
religion, as factors that inspire parties to feud against one another. Over all, although the 
violence remained local in context- between and among local ethnic, regional and religious 
forces in Nigeria- they nevertheless have nation-wide implication for the democratization 
process in post-colonial Nigeria. In recent times, external forces have teamed with local 
elements to raise the scepter of violence and insecurity in Nigeria, namely the Boko Haram 
insurgency. However, the Ombatse crisis of May 2013 adds up to the identity politics 
manifesting in sectarian forms along religious, ethnic and regional lines, sometimes also 
taking the form of indigene-settler rifts, all which continually shape the violence that define 
Nigeria’s security challenges. In this crisis scores of lives were lost, on both sides -security 
forces (30) - (BBC News, 9 May, 2013) and 21 Eggons, (www.informationng.com/2013/05) 
when the government agents stormed Alakyo, an Eggon village to arrest the chief priest of 
the Ombatse cult, BabaAlakyo. The cult group were allegedly embarked on forceful initiation 
into its membership of adherents of other religions and ethnic groups (ibid). Although the 
Ombatse cultists claimed it was on a spiritual renewal- to clean the Eggon society of sundry 
mundane ills, in reality, the crisis had a political component- Eggon protestation of their 
marginalization from the governorship of Nasarawa state since its creation in 1996. They 
were determined to produce the governor for the state by 2015, hence the mantra 
underpinning the revolt, Ombaste- ‘Our Time has Come’. 
This paper addresses the following four research questions about this crisis: (1). Does 
the crisis truly reflect a religious- puritanical mission or merely mirror the identity, 
hegemonic and exclusionary politics in the area cum the larger Nigerian society; does the 
Eggon- Hausa-Fulani feud have the potential to exacerbate the sectarian strife in Nigeria’s 
northern region and therefore deepen the polarization among Nigeria’s disparate social 
groups – thus threaten Nigeria’s efforts at consolidating her young democracy; (2) are there 
any institutional safeguards in place to forestall the promotion of discriminatory tendencies in 
the politics of the state; (3) is there the likelihood of the tendencies in the Nasarawa politics 
nudging the state into violence after the 2015 elections; and (4) what viable solutions are 
available to address the potentially violate situation? Indeed the first research question 
becomes important as it can provide clues to similar scenarios in places as Taraba and Plateau 
states where identity and hegemonic politics are as verdant.  
Some Theoretical Explorations   
The Ombatse revolt certainly does not approximate contemporary Islamism, and may 
not likely do so. However, Ankie Hoogvelt’s explanation of the root of the current Islamic 
resurgence across the world may yet provide useful insight on how identity, hegemony and 
exclusionary politics can either acting solely, or combine to throw a society, especially 
deeply divided ones, into tumult. Thus according to her, “Islamic resurgence is best 
understood as a politics of identity in response to exclusion…” (Hoogvelt, 2001:199). Stefan 
Wolff (2011 as cited in Omeje, 2012:9) has argued that the “processes of democratization, 
especially in ethnically, linguistically, religiously, ideologically or otherwise diverse and 
potentially divided societies, are environments prone to conflict escalation.” Democracy in 
such society, he further contends, “requires a range of special institutional safeguards to 
prevent the emergence of conditions in which divisions within the society gain a salient 
discriminatory dimension and eventually facilitate the rise of violence as a means to realize 
group interest,” (ibid: 10). 
The point has also rightly been made that while identity politics manifest in various 
concrete and abstract forms, its true significance however lies in its impacts on world events 
on a spectrum ranging from conflict to cooperation (du Plessis, 2011: 20). Identity politics in 
the developing world tends to manifest more on the dysfunctional and destabilizing conflict 
spectrum than cooperation. Elements of negative identity, therefore, are loss, exclusion, 
deprival, fear, insecurity as opposed to belonging, inclusion, sharing, safety, security that 
characterize positive identity (ibid:21). The theme of exclusionary politics has indeed 
continued to engage increasing scholarly attention in recent times, with regards to African 
politics, obviously because it has proved the underlining factor in many a political crisis in 
many places on the African continent. In their study of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Kenya, Boas and Dunn (2013) observe, for instance that, whereas 
in the past African politics tended towards inclusiveness, the exclusiveness characteristic of 
contemporary African politics is a recent development. They explored the phenomenon of 
"autochthony" - literally meaning "son of the soil": the politics of origin and belonging- the 
claim of first/earlier arrivals to exclude more recent immigrants, and the violent conflicts it 
has generated across Africa. But outside of the issue of land or resource scarcity, Boas and 
Dunn blame the increasing phenomenon of autochthony on the failure of neo-patrimonial 
system in Africa- the decreasing capacity of the African neo-patrimonial network to distribute 
resources. In the April 2015 election in Burundi, fear of domination and exclusion by the 
minority Tutsi ethnic group over majority ethnic Hutu insistence on holding to power after 
completing constitutionally-prescribed two-term limit through President Pierre Nkurunziza 
was the cause of the pre-election violence and a failed coup d’état. Exclusionary politics also 
accounts for the political crisis and instability in the Central African Republic since 2012. 
In the context of the value of violence to politics generally, the tendency by the 
different social groups, especially in multi-ethnic societies, to use violence in different 
historical circumstances for political ascendency has been vigorously explored (Alozieuwa, 
2013). Empirical support of this theory, which derive from Alozieuwa’s work, include the 
Hausa-Fulani appropriation of the Nigerian military to hold central power between 1966 and 
1999, Yoruba use of the June 12, 1993 presidential election de-annulment violence to gain 
the presidency in 1999 through 2007, and the Niger Delta militancy that culminated to the 
ascendency of the minority ethnic Ijaw to Nigeria’s presidency, 2010- 2015. His work on the 
Boko Haram insurgency as a revolt and violent quest for Nigeria’s central power by the 
Kanuri minority ethnic group in Northern Nigeria also fits into this theoretical context 
(Alozieuwa, 2012). In the 2007-2008 general elections in Kenya, the youth reacted to four 
decades of political and social deprivation by successive governments through the use of 
violence (Mang’eni, 2010).    
The tendency to hegemonic and exclusionary politics or resistant politics through the 
instrumentality of violence is however not value-free. It could be understood in the context of 
polities where according to Turner (1980: 69) politics becomes “the struggle to dominate the 
polity [and] … for gaining control of public resources and/or (making) an exclusive claim to 
allocate state resources….” While for such tendencies, as Nigeria’s political economist Julius 
Ihonvbere, (1989), has noted, one is not necessarily looking for economic motives behind all 
individual or group actions or even looking for economic explanation of all social action, the 
Marxian theory of the primacy of material condition behind human social actions remains 
relevant in looking at the agitation by excluded groups. Exclusion from the political 
leadership in such societies limits the ability of the elite corps of such groups to expand their 
frontiers of primitive accumulation. However, the probable impact of the leadership by the 
elite corps of such groups on the material well-being of their commoners remains at the realm 
of conjecture.   
A History of Conflict  
Nasarawa: A Distant History 
Much has been written in the literature about the insensitivity of European 
imperialism in arbitrarily partitioning Africa without regards to the cultural differences of its 
peoples. Martin Meredith (2005:1) for instance, rightly notes that while marking out the 
boundaries of their new territories, European negotiators frequently resorted to drawing 
straight lines on the map, taking little or no account of the myriad of traditional monarchies, 
chiefdoms and other African societies that existed on the ground. Where the European 
imperialism did not engage in arbitrary partitioning of African territories without regards to 
cultural differences of the people, it enclosed hundreds of diverse and independent groups, 
with no common history, language or religion. Thus, Nigeria, for example, contained as many 
as over 250 ethno-linguistic groups. Kingdoms that had been historically antagonistic to one 
another were lumped together into latent hostility (ibid). 
North Central Nigeria, to which Nasarawa belongs, typifies Nigeria’s ethno-culturally 
fragmented society. It not only reflects the colonialists’ penchant for lumping together for a 
new social intercourse, disparate and oftentimes hitherto antagonistic social groups, but also 
fits into the theory that Nigeria was formed not to bring about a nation state but rather to 
“perpetually create a division between the various peoples, [and]set one group against the 
other…” (cited in Badmus Isiaka Alani, 2003:80). Now comprising six states, namely Benue, 
Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, and Plateau, and the federal capital territory, Abuja, it is 
home to a host of disparate ethno-linguistic groups in Nigeria. Nasarawa state alone hosts 
about 25 of these groups, one of which is the Eggon. The specific date of the arrival and 
settlement at their present abode of some of the major ethnic groups in Nasarawa state such 
as the Alagos, Mada, Gwandara, Koro, and the Eggon (Premium Times, online, May 22, 
2013), have been projected to about between 1232 AD and 1951 AD. But without any 
specific date, the Eggon claim to earlier arrival projects them as having arrived before any 
other ethnic group with whom they now co-habit the area. Despite claims of peaceful and 
harmonious co-existence among the ethnic groups in Nasarawa state, relations among the 
ethno-linguistic groups in the North Central region have recently been characterized by 
perennial communal and sectarian strife, especially the Plateau-Nasarawa-Benue-Kogi axis -
fostered both by hegemonic and resistance politics. 
The Eggon sense of political marginalization transcends the contemporariness of the 
current agitation however. But it can be located within the context of the Hausa-Fulani 
hegemonic politics with Islam constituting the single most important factor in the hegemonic 
drive. For emphasis, Nasarawa has always been governed by Muslims since creation. 
Although governor Al-Makura who currently epitomizes Eggon frustration, is a Muslim, he is 
Gwandara and not Hausa-Fulani. Yet there is a sense in which the Muslim domination of the 
political leadership of Nasarawa state resonates with the Hausa-Fulani Muslim hegemonic 
charge. According to Ibrahim Waziri,   
The Hausa and Fulani are two distinct ethnic groups. But when the term is used as 
Hausa-Fulani in Nigerian context, it refers to a socio-cultural group defined by loyalty to 
Islam as a religion and an ideology in broad sense. By a socio-cultural group, I mean people 
who share a destiny in norms and values in the social, economic and political spaces. 
Sometimes when this term is used it includes people who are neither ethnically Hausa nor 
Fulani but share the same vision of life that makes for the Hausa-Fulani. This is why a person 
like me even though being Kanuri ethnically will gladly pass for a Hausa-Fulani culturally 
(http://kadunavoice.com) 
The Eggon angst, therefore, fuses identity, exclusionary politics and religion. The fear 
of the Hausa-Fulani cum Moslem hegemonic agenda, whether real or imaginary and even if 
nourished by the fact of the state having not been governed by a non-Muslim/Eggon since 
inception, is therefore a strong variable in the crisis (Chris Mamman: Interview, 10 October, 
2013).  
 
Nasarawa State: Present History   
The Ombatse crisis in Alakyo village, Nasarawa state, contiguous to Abuja, in early 
May 2013, gained national attention when a contingent of Nigeria’s security forces detailed 
to arrest the high-priest of the Ombatse cult was ambushed by the group. There were loss of 
lives including those of the security forces- 10 members of the secret police, the Department 
of State Services, (DSS) and 20 members of the Mobil Police, (MOPOL) unit of the Nigerian 
Police Force (NPF). Ombaste belongs to the Eggon ethnic nationality in Nasarawa, state. The 
Ombatse cultists allegedly were forcefully initiating into their membership, adherents of other 
religions. The group claimed it was on spiritual renewal mission- to clean the Eggon society 
of sundry mundane ills (Joseph, 2013). But the crisis also espouses a political component. 
The incident which was only symptomatic of the sectarian tension that had festered in the 
area, especially between the Eggon and other groups, and fostered by ethno-religious 
dichotomies, was all about Eggon protestation of their crisis of marginalization from the 
governorship of Nasarawa state since its creation in 1996. Thus towards the 2015 general 
elections, the Eggon were determined to produce the state governor. The crisis, therefore, was 
specifically about the Eggon aspiration to the governorship of the state amidst the incumbent 
state governor’s desire for a second term. By convention the security forces were on the 
invitation of the governor.   
After its creation, the first two military administrators (Milads) of Nasarawa state 
(Abdullahi Ibrahim, October 1996-August 1998; Bala Mande, August 1998-May 1999 were 
Moslems and non-indigenes in line with the prevailing military tradition at the time- not 
posting military personnel to their states of origin as Milads. Thus the Eggon or any other 
ethnic group in Nasarawa had no opportunity to preside over the affairs of the state from 
October 1996 when the state was created under military dictatorship to May 1999 when the 
military handed over power to civilian politicians. The state governors and their religion, 
ethnic nationality and political constituency from 1999 to date are as follows:  
 
Period Governor Ethnic Group Religion Senatorial Zone 
1999-2007 Abdullahi 
Adamu 
Ahua Moslem  South-West  
2007-2011 Aliyu Akwe 
Doma 
Alago Moslem  Nasarawa South 
2011-Date Tanko Al-
Makura 
Gwandara Moslem Nasarawa South 
 
Source: Author’s Table 
Although the Eggon governorship aspiration had met with frustration since 1999, the 
ethnic group was optimistic that 2015 was its appointed time- turn; they had prayed to their 
local god, Azhili for a change in their political (mis)fortune in the state. According to Zachary 
Zamani Allumag, an Eggon and retired magistrate, “[A]s 2015 is approaching, we are aware 
that some people are planning to ensure the Eggon people are dislodged from the politics of 
the state. So, they call us all kinds of names to hang us” (Sunday Sun, 2 June, 2013).Thus the 
Eggon agitation is aptly encapsulated by the Ombatse mantra, ‘Our Time Has Come/This is 
our Turn’ despite that the cult, according to Eggon legend is as old as the ethnic group itself. 
The conflict, on the one hand was, therefore, about the struggle for political ascendency and 
supremacy between the Eggon and the Hausa-Fulani in a culturally-defined sense and on the 
other, Eggon resistance to Hausa-Fulani domination, according to Martha, an Eggon 
(interview, 16 September, 2013)   
Governor Al-Makura angst against the Ombatse cultists was allegedly due to earlier 
clashes between the latter and mercenaries allegedly procured by the former and camped at 
his Kwandere hometown. But crucial in understanding the distrust of the Eggon/Ombatse by 
Al-Makura’s Gwandara ethnic group and other supporter forces in Nasarawa and proscription 
of the Ombatse by the Al-Makura-led government is that the alleged forceful administration 
of oath on non-Ombatse worshippers in the Nasarawa Eggon area between March 31, 2013 
and April 7, 2013, was intended that in the 2015 elections, the Eggon would only vote for 
Eggon candidates irrespective of party affiliations, (Sunday Sun, online, 2 June 2013). More 
so, under the cover of spiritual revival, Ombatse recruitment drive targeted mainly the youth 
who were given “native charms and/or amulets ‘that could ward off bullets,’” (Premium 
Times, online, 22 May, 2013). Martha (interview, 16 September 2013) like any other Eggon, 
as Zabura Musa Akwanshiki, Abdullahi Usman, Shuaibu Alkali, and Iliyasu Hassan Gyabo 
and Hasuna Musa Zico Kigbu however, contests Ombatse characterization as an ethnic 
militia or cult group (interview, 20 September 2013).  
The Eggon claim the most- educated and enlightened of the ethnic groups in 
Nasarawa (Martha interview). Against the backdrop of Ombatse’s Eggon minority ethnic 
status, however, with the cult’s activities confined to Nasarawa geo-political space, alleged 
forced oath-taking among its folks and Eggon concomitant desperation for political power 
may all combine to project the group as a monster and so politically alienate the Eggon. In 
the context of power struggle, among the ethnic groups in Nasarawa, therefore, for Al-
Makura, both Ombatse oath administration and Eggon agitation evoke the Mau Mau 
Movement of the Kenyan Kikuyu ethnic group oath-taking ritual during the independent 
struggles. The Mau Mau was characterized as “a sinister tribal cult affecting a largely 
primitive and superstitious people, confused and bewildered by their contact with the 
civilized world and prey to the malevolent designs of ambitious politicians,” (Meredith, 
2006:79). Ombatse’s ‘This is our Time’ mantra, also draws a foreboding parallel to 
Umkhonto we Sizwe, (Spear of the Nation), the organization used by Black South Africans in 
the struggles against the Apartheid regime. Umkhonto we Sizwe had started its armed 
struggle, with a warning that, ‘[T]he time comes in the life of any nation when there remains 
only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come’ (Ibid: 24-125). The Uniao das 
Populacoes de Angola (UPA), which spear-headed the independence of Angola also started 
out as a tribal organization by the Bakongo ethnic group to resurrect the old Kongo Kingdom, 
before subsequently proclaiming nationalist objectives (ibid:135).  
Although the Eggon have not expressed a separatist agenda either from Nigeria or 
Nasarawa state, they are nevertheless driven by acute sense of political marginalization 
(Mamman: interview).Their agitation thus is anchored more on a sense of exclusion, than on 
indigene/settler rift, the latter which has been an important ingredient nourishing the festering 
bloodletting between the ‘indigenous’ Christian ethnic groups in the Jos Plateau area and 
their settler Muslim Hausa-Fulani rival. For other ethnic groups in Nasarawa however, the 
counter charge of domineering tendencies against the Eggon and subsequent distrusted by 
those other groups have not helped the Eggon political cause (interview (2013): Abdullahi 
Liman, 21 September; Abdul Tukur, Rabo Bakare, and Asabe Musa: 12 October). Manshop 
Peter Garba, a Kagoro from neighbouring Kaduna state, links the Eggon-phobia among other 
ethnic groups in Nasarawa to the Eggon achievement in Western education and spread across  
the nooks and crannies of the state; hence the deployment policy (interview: 18 September, 
2013). The distrust ensures that during elections, other ethnic groups in Nasarawa combine 
their respective populations to neutralize Eggon numerical strength (interview (2013): Hope 
Eweka, 19 September; Nkiru Okoro, 12 October and Zakari Adamu, 20 September).  
 
Methodology  
This paper is based on descriptive survey in Abuja and Lafia, capital of Nasarawa 
state, North-Central within the Middle Belt region of Nigeria. Conducted in 2013, qualitative 
information is obtained through personal, in-depth interviews and focus-group discussions, 
constituting the primary sources of the study. The qualitative information from these sources 
are gotten from seven Eggon and eight non-Eggon natives, providing both Eggon and non-
Eggon perspectives to the issue. The choice of non-Eggon minority persons is premised on 
the assumption that as minorities themselves, more so, from the Middle Belt, their 
perspective can be useful in understanding the politics of dominance and resistance in the 
area in the general framework of majority- minority politics in Nigeria and the North 
particularly. The interviewees are chosen based on their knowledge of the area and its politics 
and they range from government functionaries, peace and conflict experts, community 
association members, and ordinary folks (see their names and positions at the time in 
Appendix A).  
The open-ended approach was used for the questionnaire in order to allow for as 
much information as possible. Some of the questions posed to the interviewees included: 
(1).How true is the allegation that Ombatse is a cult and ethnic militia; is Ombatse really out 
to sanitize society or is a political tool? (2). Why have the Eggon been unable to produce the 
governor of the state despite their numerical strength? (3). Why have the other minority 
ethnic groups in Nasarawa state failed to support their fellow minority, the Eggon, against the 
majority Hausa-Fulani? (4). What do you think the tense politics of Nasawara state potent for 
the Middle Belt in views its many disparate ethnic groups? (5) How do you think the problem 
can be solved even within the larger Nigerian context? Indeed the notoriety of the Hausa-
Fulani hegemonic tendencies both in Nigeria and its North is well-documented in the 
literature. Therefore, secondary sources are used on issues in reference to that subject in this 
study. Other secondary sources include works of scholars, which were robustly x-rayed. The 
study also made use of newspaper reports of the crisis because of the contemporariness of the 
subject.  
Empirical Findings  
This section addresses the four research questions which the paper sought to 
investigate from the outset. 
 
Research question 1 – Ombatse crisis: Religious-puritanical agenda or  
Identity/hegemonic politics 
Conflicts in the Nasarawa area revolve around the themes of mutual suspicion and 
fear of domination among the groups, discrimination/indigeneship/representation in 
traditional institutions/competition for farming/grazing lands and unaddressed complaints.*1 
Empirical findings on the crisis under investigation while fitting into these traditional 
analytical frameworks, have no linkage whatsoever with any form of spiritual rejuvenation 
contrary to Ombatse claims. The following instances might suffice: the confrontation 
between the Eggon and the Gwandara ethnic group in Kwandere in February, 2013 during 
which the palace of the governor Al-Makura’s elder brother was burnt down, was a fall-out of 
the conflict between the Eggon and Fulani over farming and grazing issues; the deployment 
policy adopted by the state government aimed at relocating the Eggon from their settlements 
across the state back to Nasarawa Eggon and Akwanga areas, which was however challenged 
up to the Nigerian Supreme Court, derived from the Eggon search for farmlands and 
subsequent spread to other areas of the state outside of their ‘ancestral homestead’. That 
search constantly pits them against other ethnic groups, including the Fulani, whose livestock 
graze on the Eggon farms; the Fulani on their part allege cattle-rustling against the Eggon. 
Baba Alakyo’s insistence that the Emir of Lafia (a Hausa-Fulani) should first seek the 
permission of his ethnic (Eggon) paramount leader, (ThisDay, online, May 19, 2013) before 
he would respond to the Emir’s summon over Ombatse’s  activities, clearly reflects the 
supremacy tussle in respect of the traditional institutions of the various ethnic groups in 
Nasarawa. This underlines Eggon’s rejection of Hausa-Fulani ‘domination since the creation 
of Nasarawa state in 1996.’ The deployment policy further nourishes the tension between the 
Eggon and the state government. The crisis, therefore, has no puritanical objective but strictly 
reflects domination and resistance politics.  
Research question 2 - The Potential to deepen sectarianism and polarization among 
Nigeria’s disparate social groups and threaten Nigeria’s efforts at democratic 
consolidation  
In 2011, two variables played important role in President Jonathan’s electoral success 
over his challenger, General Muhammadu Buhari, of then Congress for Progressive Change 
(CPC) in the non-Muslim Northern minority areas. One was the common Christian faith of 
Jonathan and the non-Muslim Christian minorities. The other, perhaps, more important, was 
Jonathan’s shared minority status with these groups, some of whom were neither Christians 
nor Moslems. In the post- election office sharing politics, the protestation from other ethnic 
groups in the state against the ceding of Nasarawa ‘s slot in the federal cabinet to the Eggon 
seemed to have made little impression on then President Jonathan as the Eggon candidate, 
Labaran Maku who manned the administration’s information portfolio also became a member 
of Jonathan’s kitchen-cabinet. Maku’s appointment in 2014 as supervising minister of the 
defense ministry  
____________ 
*1. These issues are contained in the various reports on the crises in the state, including the 
2002 Nasawara state Government memorandum explaining the nature and scope of the inter-
communal conflicts in Nasarawa state submitted to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into 
the Inter-Communal Conflicts in Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba states. Not only 
underlined Jonathan’s confidence in him, but further underscored the profound divisiveness 
Nigeria’s politics had turned towards the 2015 general elections.  
Indeed towards the polls, the fault-lines of ethnicity and religion featured prominently 
in the electioneering campaigns. With the general perception, especially among the Christians 
that the Boko Haram insurgency was a Northern Muslim opposition to a Christian-Southerner 
presidency, appointment of Maku, a Christian Northern minority to supervise the defence 
portfolio hitherto superintended by a Hausa-Fulani Muslim resonated keenly among 
Jonathan’s non-Muslim Northern and Southern supporters who rightly or wrongly perceived 
it as a countervailing measure against Northern Muslim conspiracy. Thus, Nasarawa state in 
itself presented a scenario that mixed politics, religion, and ethnicity; remained potentially 
explosive, and raised the already charged political temperature in Nigeria. Without any real 
safeguard within the Nasarawa political firmament to address the Eggon concerns as the 2015 
general polls approached, tension heightened and fears of breakout of violence was genuine. 
Eggon desperation for the Nasarawa governorship was quite obvious. Having thrown their 
support in 2011 behind Al-Makura, who has an Eggon mother, with the understanding that he 
would easily cede power to them after one term, the Eggon were sore over the 
disappointment from their nephew. Although of the Gwandara stock, Al-Makura’s paternal 
ancestry is Kano, a core Hausa Muslim city. Thus, rather than his maternal origin, Al-
Makura’s loyalty went to his Hausa-Muslim paternity.  
 
The Hausa-Fulani Muslims have never hidden their determination to establish their 
hegemony over Nasarawa from where they could spread both their political and religious 
influence in the surrounding areas and even beyond. In fact, the conspiracy theory contends 
that Nasarawa was carved out essentially for that purpose from the old Plateau state, where 
the Hausa-Fulani Muslims had been feuding with native Christian population. Hence the 
Muslim stranglehold on the political leadership of the state from inception. Al-Makura picked 
the gubernatorial ticket of the All Progressive Congress (APC), thereby denying the Eggon 
the much-anticipated support from him for 2015. Meanwhile, having failed to clinch his 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) ticket for the poll, Eggon candidate for the Nasarawa 
governorship, Labaran Maku, dumped the PDP for the All Progressive Grand Alliance 
(APGA). APGA as a political party was formed by the late Igbo folk’s hero, Chukwuemeka 
Odimegwu Ojukwu essentially as Igbo political vehicle. Since its formation in 2003, APGA 
has only made marginal political impression in the Igbo South-east region of Nigeria- a 
predominantly Christian area. The Igbo outside of their area, reputedly are the second largest 
after the indigenous population. Maku’s permutations were to rally the Igbo support while 
also playing the Christian card, but poll’s results did not match his pre-election calculations.    
Noteworthy is that as soon as the APC was registered as a political party in February 
2013, by the Independent National Electoral Commission, (INEC), members from across 
Nigeria converged in Nasarawa to celebrate the achievement. The import was not lost on the 
discerning public. Until it joined forces with other political parties and associations to form 
the APC, the CPC controlled only one state in Nigeria-Nasarawa. Although neither the entire 
membership of the PDP nor CPC/APC is wholly Christian or Muslim, the CPC et al, now 
APC, is perceived generally as a Muslim Hausa-Fulani party. The Convergence in the only 
state under its control at the time was resoundingly symbolic: it projected the battle for 
Nasarawa as fought on two fronts, namely, political, and ethno-religious. By the gathering, 
the core Hausa-Fulani elements among the promoters of the APC hinted their resolve not to 
concede the state to any other political party or folks. The group was also determined to 
consolidate Muslim Hausa-Fulani control over the state. With the violence that erupted in 
parts of the North after General Buhari loss to Jonathan in 2011, amidst Eggon’s Ombatse 
mantra, fears of post-election violence in Nasarawa in 2015 was high whichever way the 
victory went- either to the Hausa-Fulani camp or the Eggon. Nasarawa’s proximity to the 
Nigeria’s capital also made the ethno-religious tension there more worrisome for Abuja 
against the backdrop of the rising agitation by the natives of the Federal Capital Territory that 
elective political offices in the capital city be their exclusive reserve.  Indeed the appointment 
of another Eggon, Patricia Akwashiki, a Christian into the vacant Information portfolio 
towards the presidential election betrayed Jonathan’s seeming patronage of the Eggon. 
Strategically, it was premised on its potential to rally the region’s mainly minority Christian 
population for similar electoral outcomes as in 2011. Rightly or wrongly, the perception 
among Nigeria’s non-Muslims generally of Jonathan’s main challenger then as in 2015, 
General Buhari, as Hausa-Fulani Muslim candidate persisted. In the end, the PDP counter-
measure against the APC failed to yield its anticipated outcome. The PDP garnered 273,460 
votes (53.6 % of the votes) as against APC’s 236, 838, (46.4%) which however surpassed the 
25 percent constitutional requirement for a presidential win. For the April 11, 2015 
gubernatorial polls in Nasarawa, the Hausa-Fulani Muslim candidate, APC’s Al-Makura 
routed Eggon’s APGA candidate, polling a total of 191, 463 votes as against Maku’s 114, 
674 for the second position thus confirming Garba, et al theory of alliance by other ethnic 
groups against the Eggon during the elections in spite of the latter’s numerical strength. 
Invariably Eggon allegation of ethnic cleansing agenda against their stock and both local and 
foreign mercenary involvement in the violence (Sunday Sun, online, June 2, 2013) add new 
dimensions to the crisis and is capable of exacerbating the tension in the area. Amid 
increasing violence by the Fulani militia in the state, Eggon charge against the Hausa-Fulani 
of importing their kinsmen from neighbouring countries in the fights against them (Martha, 
interview, 16 September 2013), is capable of deepening sectarianism and polarization in a 
country where Fulani violence has become major a concern among other ethnic groups.    
Research question 3 - likelihood of the tendencies in the Nasarawa politics nudging the 
state into violence after the 2015 elections 
As our research has shown, Nasarawa state is a contested political turf. Hitherto the 
only state in the hands of the opposition CPC that merged with other political groupings to 
form the APC now in power both in the state and the center, the Hausa-Fulani/APC factor in 
the politics of the state combine with the Eggon crisis of marginalization to make the state 
potentially explosive especially during elections. The violence which marked Nigeria’s 2011 
general election in parts of Northern Nigeria, owed essentially to northern hegemonic forces’ 
rejection of southern Christian presidency. Against that backdrop, towards the 2015 elections, 
there were genuine fears that with the Hausa-Fulani/APC resolve to retain the state clashing 
with Eggon/Ombatse ‘It’s our turn’ mantra, the Nasarawa election was likely going to be 
characterized by violence. But in order to deflate the built-up tension in the state, major 
candidates in the gubernatorial contest were committed to a non-violence pact by 
stakeholders, which entailed acceptance of the election results, without upsetting the peace.  
Research question 4 - Viable solutions to address the potentially violate situation?   
The only mechanism that approximates any discernable safeguard to the crisis of 
domination in Nasarawa politics was the zoning arrangement which aimed at rotating the 
governorship of the state among the three senatorial district of Nasarawa North, South and 
South-west. The zoning arrangement ran smoothly from 1999, until 2015 when Al-Makura 
insisted on another term rather than allow a candidate from Nasarawa North according to the 
zoning formulae. The zoning had run in the following order: Nasarawa South West (1999-
2007: Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu); Nasarawa South (2007-2015: Alhaji Aliyu Akwe Doma and 
Alhaji Tanko Al-Makura). Had Al-Makura stepped down for a Nasarawa North candidate in 
the 2015 elections, Al-Makura could have done only a term, a development that could have 
maintained the zoning arrangement and doused the fear of domination. Towards 2015, signs 
that Al-Makura would contest the governorship sparked off the Ombaste crisis –‘It’s our 
time’- and fueled the tension in which Nasarawa was soaked during the elections. 
Rather than the pre-election peace accord to forestall violent reactions to the election 
results, the prevailing peace could be deduced from two sources, namely, former President 
Jonathan’s conceding of defeat to his perennial challenger Buhari, which deflated the built-up 
tension across the country and the presence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 
Nigeria during the election. The ICC signaled its intention to prosecute actor(s)/player(s) that 
incited violence prior to, during and after the elections, a development that obviously 
restrained trouble-makers. After initially fearing outbreak of violence, thus postponing the 
announcement of its decision on the election petition filed by Maku, against Al-Makura, the 
Elections Tribunal finally re-affirmed Al-Makura’s victory. The anticipated violent reaction 
to the development from the Eggon did not occur.    
 
Discussion   
The paper considered the Ombatse crisis vis-à-vis the 2015 general elections posing a 
number of empirical and theoretical questions as listed in the foregoing paragraphs.  
As we saw, the politics of Nasarawa state generally, including the 2015 gubernatorial 
election outcome, on the one hand fitted into the themes of identity, hegemony, exclusionary 
and resistant politics. On the theme of identity, Boas and Dunn’s postulation that the 
phenomenon of autochthony is a recent development in African politics needs serious 
interrogation. This paper proposes a direction. The politics of origin and belonging or ‘son-
of-the-soil’ has existed in Africa as far back as the colonial period and deservedly occupied 
the attention of many an African scholar. Nigerian scholar, Alubo (2008:1) for instance, 
underlines identity politics as being at the root of the many cases in which violence is 
perpetrated against Nigerians also by Nigerians “who are citizens of the Federal Republic but 
not regarded and treated as citizens of particular spaces within Nigeria’s territory.” Identity 
politics can thus manifest in the form of religion but more as ethnicity, the latter, which in its 
more visceral forms is further broken down into “indigenes” (natives/son-of-the-soil) versus 
“settlers” or “strangers” (ibid). Thus “[B]oth sets of identity refer to some relationship to the 
land; not a return to the feudalism of yore but claims over who arrived in a particular location 
first,” (ibid). For all intents and purposes, the indigene-settler feud underpins the perennial 
bloodbath in the entire Middle-Belt and North-Central generally and the Plateau particularly 
between the Berom, Afizere and others and the Hausa-Fulani. Within its identity politics 
framework, the Ombatse crisis espouses Eggon outrage over their feeling of marginalization 
and oppression by the Hausa-Fulani hegemony and subsequent resistance hinged on a claim 
of earlier arrival in the Nasarawa area by the former over the latter.   
On the whole, the outcome of the Nasarawa election reflected a number of themes in 
our theoretical frameworks. For example, beyond identity, it mirrors the deep divisions 
among the ethnic groups in the state as also the struggle for the control of the political 
apparatus of the state between the Eggon majority group and the Muslim Hausa-Fulani, 
which underpins the Ombatse crisis. Although the Eggon bloc vote had secured the electoral 
victory for Al-Makura in 2011, in 2015 a political re-alignment between Al-Makura and other 
ethnic groups, effectively neutralized Eggon’s numerical strength. Ironically those other 
ethnic groups placed less premium on Al-Makura’s Hausa-Fulani Muslim religious 
affiliation. Their support invariably mirrors the distrust of the Eggon. Nasarawa politics 
obviously also falls within the framework of a polity characterized by the ‘struggle to 
dominate the polity [and] … for gaining control of public resources and/or (making) an 
exclusive claim to allocate state resources.’ It explains Maku’s desperation, which informed 
his decision to dump the PDP for APGA. His refusal to accept the election result goes beyond 
the primordial promptings of the Eggon folks. It is, specifically about the Eggon political 
elite, losing out to the Hausa-Fulani counterpart. Were the ‘It’s our turn’ (Ombatse) mantra 
not an elitist project, the Eggon commoner could have violently protested the electoral loss. 
Maku’s loss at the election tribunal failed to inspire them to violence. 
 
More so, although the non-eruption of violence in the post-election period may seem 
to challenge our theory on the tendency by the different Nigerian social groups to use 
violence for political ascendency in different historical circumstances, the pre-election 
violence by the Ombatse cult yet supports the theory. Nevertheless, due attention needs be 
paid to the role of the International Criminal Court, (ICC) in the 2015 elections in Nigeria. 
The presence of ICC, arguably, served the deterrence function of discouraging the Eggon 
political elite from inciting the people to violence. Accordingly, the effect of the ICC 
presence during the 2015 election in Nigeria has proven the critical role, which the 
international community using such important instrument as the ICC can play in the 
consolidation process of emerging democracies. Mere sending of election observers and 
monitors to developing democracies is clearly no longer enough. The ICC should, therefore, 
make its presence in such polities a priority.  
The voting did not however support Eggon pretensions to spiritual renaissance within 
the traditional African religious framework. The non-Muslim ethnic groups that joined forces 
with the Muslim Hausa-Fulani to defeat the Eggon candidate, Maku, thus making politically-
irrelevant, Eggon’s 47 percent of Nasarawa population, are either adherents of the traditional 
African religion or Christians. This paper proposes that Nasarawa deserves more attention 
both nationally and internationally than it currently gets, one, because of the involvement of 
foreigner elements - fighters from neighboring African countries who came in support of 
their Muslim Hausa-Fulani folks in Nasarawa amid growing insecurity in Nigeria symbolized 
by the Boko Haram and Fulani militia violence. Two, because of the potentials of the 
violence feeding into the existing ethno-religious tension in Northern Nigeria generally and 
the North-Central in particular. With Nasarawa’s proximity to Abuja, amidst the restiveness 
of the Abuja indigenous population over political offices in the Nigeria’s capital, latent 
autochthony feelings in Abuja could spill to the surface. It is capable of threatening Nigeria’s 
stability and her young democracy. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations  
This paper has attempted to provide an insight into the tenuous relations between the 
Eggon ethnic group and their Hausa-Fulani counterpart in Nasarawa state, North-central 
Nigeria. The Eggon, as the study has shown, are a minority ethnic group in Nigeria, whereas 
the Hausa-Fulani are a majority ethnic group. The Hausa-Fulani political forces, have always 
trounced the Eggon in the struggle for the political leadership of the state. There is, therefore, 
the likelihood of viewing the problem from the general framework of majority- minority 
politics in Nigeria. But this could be misleading in that although in the context of the status of 
ethnic groupings in Nigeria, the Eggon are a minority, they however constitute the largest 
ethnic group in Nasarawa. The Hausa-Fulani have however been able to perpetuate the Eggon 
political frustration by exploiting the mutual distrust between the Eggon and other non-
Hausa- Fulani ethnic groups, even when the Hausa-Fulani hegemony hardly benefits these 
other groups. The paper therefore makes the following recommendations: 
From indications, the safeguard, which Stefan speaks of in heterogeneous and divided 
societies is clearly absent in Nasarawa politics. Amid the reality of truncating the zoning 
arrangement, there is currently no discernable power-sharing framework that conveys a sense 
of belonging not only to the Eggon but also the other social groups in Nasarawa. 
Stakeholders, who should encompass political actors and other entities such as elders, 
religious leaders, ethnic associations, etc should insist that the zoning arrangement be 
respected. Within the senatorial districts, the zoning should further apply in order to 
accommodate less vocal minor and marginalized groups. The truncated PDP zoning 
arrangement, which stipulated rotation of the presidency between the North and South 
provides a good template. It broadly aims at dousing the unnerving tension usually associated 
with contestation of central power in Nigeria and to manage the tenuous social relations 
among Nigeria’s disparate social groups. In the meantime, Al-Makura’s should run an 
inclusive government that importantly accommodates the various social groups in the state.  
While the sense of outrage over continuing eroding of the societal moral fabrics even 
within the Christian-Muslim milieu is a fact and has in some instances elicited suggestions of 
recourse to traditional templates with beliefs they could foster a more effective social control 
mechanism and moral system, Ombatse should however shed its self-imposed puritan 
mission. Ombatse can hardly camouflage its political agenda despite the spiritual revivalist 
posturing. The group’s claim as “a spiritual body that has emerged to revive the well- known 
and highly respected norms and traditions of the Eggon handed over by our ancestors… 
[with] the sole aim …to cleanse our society of increasing ills just as any religious body in 
Nigeria aims to achieve,” (Daily Trust, December 10, 2012, p. 58) can only excite a great 
deal of dissonance in an acutely and religiously-contested environment as Nasarawa. The 
state is not homogenous and attempt by the Eggon to impose its world-view on others 
exposes an extremist tendency that could also elicit extreme reactions from other forces while 
raising the scepter of religious-related violence in the North to which that region is prone. It 
will add to the growing insecurity plaguing Nigeria.  
The parallel between the events in Plateau state and the scenarios in Nasarawa also 
deserve attention. Campbell and Harwood have noted that “[I]n Jos itself and in some 
outlying villages, the violence has led to ethnic cleansing that recalls the Balkans. Formerly 
mixed villages or Jos neighbourhood now consist of only single ethnic group,” (Daily Trust, 
Friday, 19, July 2013, p. 3). Although the Eggon have defeated the Nasarawa government 
deployment policy at the Supreme Court, the group’s perception of the policy as a 
containment strategy should guide policy makers in the state to ensure that no attempts are 
made in other subtle ways to outwit the law. No such policy should be directed against any 
group as doing so could only worsen social relations. What is needed are policies that 
enhance social cohesion.   
Abuja should contemplate the Ombatse crisis beyond the death of security personnel 
or the state as a mere object in the political permutations. Seeming State perception of the 
problem as localized event with no direct threat to Abuja is faulty. Abuja should encourage 
peaceful resolution of the crisis. Western attention that views the crisis from the lens of 
festering sectarian violence in Nigeria is also mistaken. The Muslim vs ‘Other’ element in the 
crisis could attract international mujahedeen, more so with the reported involvement of 
foreigner elements in the violence. 
Recommendations of the past commission of inquiries over past violence and crises in 
the state should be implemented and those who suffered human and material loses in those 
circumstances should be compensated in order to invoke a sense of justice.  
   One important lesson from the ICC intervention in the 2015 general elections in 
Nigeria, is the critical role international agency like the ICC can play in divided societies as 
Nasarawa and Nigeria. Nigerians and the civil society groups in the country should pressure 
that the presence of the ICC during major elections be part of Nigeria’s electoral process. 
Indeed hints by the African Union (AU) to commence trial of political offenders will be of 
added value. 
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
From the foregoing analysis, it is obvious that despite the prevailing calm, the 
Eggon/Hausa-Fulani political wrangling is far from over. The political situations in that state 
should, therefore, be of continued interest not only to scholarly research but also to policy 
makers, more so because of the proximity of the state to Abuja, Nigeria’s political capital. 
Indeed the inability of the Eggon or any other ethnic group in Nasarawa state to assume the 
governorship of the state rather than the political savvy of the Hausa-Fulani owes essentially 
to the inability of other groups in the state to pool together their political resources to throw 
off the Hausa-Fulani hegemonic yoke. We suggest that this should be of a subject of further 
research from this study. What has sustained the Hausa-Fulani Muslim hegemony in 
Nasarawa over and amidst mutually antagonistic ethno-religious groups despite the latter’s 
collective numerical superiority? Since democracy is a game of numbers, why have these 
other social groups been unable to exploit their aggregate superior numerical advantage to 
end their collective political predicament? Why would the Eggon align politically with the 
Hausa-Fulani Muslim elements in 2011 instead of rallying behind non-Hausa-Fulani political 
forces in the state? Moreover, while the Nasarawa problem is expressed in political terms, it 
is not limited merely to the struggle for the capture of the state political apparatus between 
the Eggon and the Hausa-Fulani. Issues of religion and particularly autochthony also 
underline the latent hostility that pervade social relations not only between the Eggon and 
Hausa-Fulani, but also among the ethno-religious groups in Nasarawa. After fulfilling the 
necessary conditions, why has Nasawara not yet assumed the dubious status of Jos Plateau, 
also in the North-central, where indigene-settler rift often mutating into ethno-religious feud 
has created perennial sectarian blood-letting? The potentials are still there. These should also 
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Appendix A  
Interviewees: 
1. Martha X – An Eggon woman and Aide of former President Goodluck Jonathan. She 
lives in Abuja (interview, 16 September, 2013) 
2. Hasuna Musa Zico Kigbu – (Chairman, Ombatse) (interview, 20 September, 2013) 
3. Zabura Musa Akwanshiki,(Secretary, Ombatse) (interview, 20 September, 2013) 
4. Abdullahi Usman (Member, Ombatse) (interview, 20 September, 2013) 
5. Shuaibu Alkali (Member, Ombatse) (interview, 20 September, 2013) 
6. Iliyasu Hassan Gyabo (Member, Ombatse) (interview, 20 September, 2013)  
7. Chris Mamman- National President, Eggon Cultural Development Association, 
(ECDA) (interview, 10 October 2013) 
8. Manshop Peter Garba- Deputy Director and Researcher at the Institute for Peace and 
Conflict Resolution, IPCR, Abuja. Although from near-by Kaduna state, Manshop 
lives in Nasarawa among the various tribes in the state. He has good grasp of the 
politics of the state (interview 18 September, 2013).  
9. Hope Eweka- a non-Eggon who grew up in the Nasarawa Eggon. Formerly a 
Researcher with the IPCR, she is now with the Nigerian Communications 
Commission, NCC (interview, 18 September, 2013). 
10. Rabo Bakare- of the Hausa/Fulani stock, Rambo formerly of the IPCR, now with the 
Nasarawa State University, Keffi (interview,  12 October, 2013) 
11. Dr. Abdullahi Liman- An Hausa, formerly of the University of Abuja, but now with 
the Nasarawa State University, Keffi (interview, 21 September, 2013).  
12. Nkiru Okoro, an Igbo, and trader, Nkiru was born in Agyaragu, Nasarawa State. She 
was raised among the Gwandaras, Koros, Alagos, Agatus, Eggons, and other tribes in 
Nasarawa state. She now lives in Masaka, near Abuja (interview, 12 October, 2013).  
13. Abdul Tukur, a Gwandara petty trader from Lafia. He lives in Masaka, near Abuja 
(interview, 12 October, 2013). 
14. Asabe Musa, An Hausa unemployed political science graduate from Lafia. She 
resides in Abuja (interview, 12 October, 2013). 
15. Zakari Adamu- of the Alago ethnic group and an officer of the Nigerian Immigration 
Services, (NIS). He lives in Abuja (interview, 20 September, 2013).   
 
 
 
 
